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Nutrient Water Quality Trading: A MarketBased Solution to Water Pollution in the
Natural State*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decades since the passage of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), our nation’s waters remain impaired by
dangerous levels of nutrients such as phosphorous and
nitrogen, which can cause serious health impacts. 1
Excess nutrients also have a substantial environmental
impact on waterbodies, 2 which in turn diminishes the
recreational value of these resources. 3 Efforts to control
these nutrient levels place a substantial economic burden
on local governments in both providing clean drinking
water as well as treating wastewater. 4 The CWA’s
cooperative federalism approach divides sources of
nutrient pollution into two categories: (1) point sources,

*

The author thanks Professor Sara Rollet Gosman, and several members of the
Arkansas Bar Association Environmental Law Section for their guidance, encouragement,
and criticism throughout the drafting of this comment. All errors remain the author’s. Any
comments or questions may be directed to the author at nrfinch@gmail.com.
1.
The Problem, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/problem
[https://perma.cc/9FZF-93XY] (“Nutrient pollution is one of nation’s most
widespread, costly and challenging environmental problems.”); ARK. NAT. RES.
COMM’N, 2011-2016 NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN 53, 54
(2012) [hereinafter NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN],
http://www.arkansaswater.org/data/Full_NPSPlan_Document.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U53K-ZXJ2].
2.
The
Effects:
Environment,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/effects-environment [https://perma.cc/GW3ZQ86V].
3.
EPA, THE FACTS ABOUT NUTRIENT POLLUTION 2 (2012),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201503/documents/facts_about_nutrient_pollution_what_is_hypoxia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FG7D-K4VH] (noting that the U.S. economy loses close to $1
billion annually from losses in fishing and other recreational activities).
4. Kan. State Univ., Freshwater Pollution Costs US At Least $4.3 Billion a
Year,
SCI.
DAILY
(Nov.
17,
2008),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11/081112124418.htm.
[https://perma.cc/DN7F-N6K8].
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and (2) nonpoint sources. 5 Point sources are “discrete
conveyance[s]” such as the end of a pipe from an
industrial facility or municipal wastewater treatment plant
discharging to surface waters. 6 Nonpoint sources are
every other source, 7 but most nonpoint source nutrient
loads come from agricultural activities and increasing
urbanization. 8 The CWA places mandatory regulations on
point sources, but nonpoint source regulations are largely
determined at the state level. 9
Over the years, states have primarily addressed
nonpoint source pollution by encouraging voluntary
participation in federally funded programs. 10
This
11
Because states
approach has seen limited success.
have not made the necessary progress to reduce nutrient
loads from nonpoint sources of pollution, the burden to
meet water quality standards in streams impaired by
nutrient pollution is met by reducing the point source’s
permit limits for nutrients—primarily affecting municipal
wastewater treatment plants. 12 Below certain levels,
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012); What is Nonpoint Source?, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/polluted-runoff-nonpoint-source-pollution/what-nonpoint-source
[https://perma.cc/YD8T-CBC3].
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
7. What is Nonpoint Source?, supra note 5 (noting that a “nonpoint source” is
“any source of water pollution that does not meet the legal definition of ‘point
source’”).
8. See id.
9. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW , SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 663-66 (7th ed. 2013).
10. Lara D. Guercio, The Struggle Between Man and Nature—Agriculture,
Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Clean Water: How to Implement the State of
Vermont’s Phosphorous TMDL Within the Lake Champlain Basin, 12 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 455, 466-69 (2011).
11. See EPA: OFFICE OF W ATER, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 1 (2003)
[hereinafter
WATER
QUALITY
TRADING
POLICY],
http://archive.epa.gov/ncer/events/calendar/archive/web/pdf/finalpolicy2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BEG9-JMRW]. A 2000 assessment revealed that “approximately
40% of the rivers, 45% of the streams and 50% of the lakes that have been
assessed still do not support their designated uses” due to uncontrolled increases
in nonpoint source pollution. Id. Since 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment has recognized the
continuing need for pollution reductions from nonpoint sources. See The Role of
Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water Objectives: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 113th Cong. vi (2014).
12. WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 6-7.
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further reductions from point sources are no longer an
economically efficient means of achieving water quality
standards. 13
In 2015, Arkansas took an important step toward
addressing this inefficient approach by passing Act 335. 14
Act 335 provides legislative approval for “nutrient water
quality trading programs,” including the use of credits,
offsets, and compliance associations. 15 This voluntary
market-based approach is the first step toward a system
wherein the mandatory reductions from point sources may
be achieved by either purchasing credits generated by
nonpoint sources that voluntarily reduce their nutrient load
or through compliance associations, which facilitate trades
between point sources. 16 Act 335 sets the foundation
upon which a regulatory framework can be constructed to
guide and encourage a voluntary market-based solution in
local watersheds. 17 State regulatory agencies must now
collaborate with the governor’s appointed advisory panel
and other stakeholders to develop a regulatory framework
that will retain the economic efficiencies available through
trading without unnecessarily risking those gains to costly
litigation, administrative delays, or water quality
degradation. 18
This comment provides policy recommendations for
developing a comprehensive nutrient water quality trading
framework, which will reduce litigation risk and delayed
13. The Role of Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water Objectives,
supra note 11, at 1-2.
14. Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-232, 233
(Supp. 2015)).
15. Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1514 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4232(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2015)).
16. Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1514-15 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 84-232(c)-(d) (Supp. 2015)).
17. Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-232,
233).
18. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-215 (Supp. 2015); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v.
EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting challenge from nonpoint
sources and deferring to EPA’s heightened requirements for Chesapeake Bay
TMDL, which is the cornerstone of nutrient trading in the Bay); Food & Water
Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 85 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting environmental
group’s challenge to EPA approval of multi-state nutrient trading scheme in the
Chesapeake Bay because they could not establish standing or show how EPA
approval of trading was “final agency action”).
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implementation. Part II provides a background on what
the CWA requires of point and nonpoint source
dischargers, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) ongoing support of watershed-based
trading programs, and the judicial developments regarding
trading. Part III offers suggestions for developing a
statewide trading framework by focusing on four key
areas: (1) requiring participating watersheds to use
numeric criteria to measure the targeted nutrient; (2)
limiting trading to those watersheds with Total Maximum
Daily Loads (TMDL) for nutrients; (3) prohibiting trades
that are likely to result in impairment; and, most
importantly, (4) determining how credits may be generated
by point and nonpoint sources. This fourth area will
require the advisory panel and state regulatory agencies
to create rules concerning credit baselines, monitoring,
uncertainty, and timing issues. 19

II. BACKGROUND
The difficulties associated with developing localized
water quality trading programs stem from the construction
of the CWA. Congress’s intent in passing the CWA was to
eliminate all sources of water pollution—a lofty goal. 20
Congress supported this goal through mandatory federal
regulations on the low-hanging fruit—point sources—but
then required states to cooperate by regulating all other
sources—nonpoint sources.
In the years since the
passage of the CWA, our nation’s water has improved
significantly in many regards. 21 However, as waterbodies
19. EPA: OFFICE OF W ASTEWATER MANAGEMENT: W ATER PERMITS DIVISION,
WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT W RITERS 10 (2009) [hereinafter
WATER
QUALITY
TRADING
TOOLKIT],
http://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V6H7E2F].
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012).
21. William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable
(Continuing) Story of the Clean Water Act, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.
25, 30 (2013) (“[I]mplementation of the section 404 program in the 1970s has
brought about a substantial decline in the rate of wetlands loss. From the mid1970s to the mid-1980s, wetlands losses in the conterminous United States fell to
approximately 290,000 acres each year, about half of the average annual losses
experienced during the twenty years before the Act was implemented.”); EPA:
OFFICE OF W ASTEWATER MGMT., PROGRESS IN W ATER QUALITY: AN EVALUATION OF
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become increasingly impaired by excess nutrients from
nonpoint sources, states have come under greater
pressure to find ways to reduce nonpoint source nutrient
loads. 22 This growing issue has also put increased
pressure on the federal government to do more to regulate
nonpoint sources, which has led to a struggle over what
EPA can require of states under the CWA to achieve the
congressional mandate of eliminating water pollution. 23
Since 1996, EPA has supported state and local watershed
trading programs. In recent years, EPA has offered
guidance 24 and funding for state trading programs, 25 but
litigation brought by both environmental and industry
advocates continues to be a costly impediment to the
success of several of these trading programs. 26 Without a
balanced approach that encourages local trades while
achieving quantifiable reductions from nonpoint sources,

THE NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL W ASTEWATER TREATMENT 7 (2000)
[hereinafter PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY], https://www.epa.gov/nscep
[https://perma.cc/RC67-C4Q3] (“[T]he 45 percent nationwide reduction in effluent
BOD5 loading and the 23 percent reduction in effluent BODU loading was achieved
during a period when total population served and influent loading of BOD both
increased by 35 percent!”).
22. See Mohammad O. Jazil & David W. Childs, EPA Imposes Strict
Numeric Nutrient Criteria in Florida: Background and Implications, 43 TRENDS 6, 6
(2011).
23. See id. at 7; Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir.
2015).
24. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11; W ATER QUALITY
TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 1; EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT
HANDBOOK i (2004) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT
HANDBOOK],
https://www.epa.gov/nscep
[https://perma.cc/8NCF-4SWR];
Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, Acting Assistant Adm’r, to Regional
Administrators, Working in Partnership with States to Address Phosphorus and
Nitrogen Pollution through Use of a Framework for State Nutrient Reductions, at 1
(Mar.
16,
2011),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/memo_nitrogen_framework.p
df [https://perma.cc/2UEY-59XL].
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(1) (2012); see also NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 24.
26. See Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2013)
(rejecting environmental group’s challenge to EPA’s multi-state nutrient trading
scheme because they could not establish standing or show how EPA approval of
trading was final agency action); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281
(3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting a majority of trade association’s challenges to EPA’s
Clean Water Act TMDL regulations and narrowly directing clarification of
ambiguous terms in the act at cost of trade association).
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the alternative may be mandatory regulations extended to
nonpoint sources. 27

A. The Requirements of the Clean Water Act
In 1972, the CWA received overwhelming bipartisan
support at a time when rivers caught fire and were
biologically unfit for leeches—much less fish. 28 The
objective of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters” by eliminating the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters by 1985 and by attaining water quality
which “provides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on
the water [by 1983].” 29 In the spirit of cooperative
federalism, enforcement of the CWA has been delegated
to forty-six states—including Arkansas—with EPA
oversight. 30

1. Point Sources
Congress saw that it could achieve rapid reductions in
water pollution nationwide by targeting “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe” discharging pollutants to surface
waters—referred to as a “point source” in the Act. 31 Point
sources are required to obtain a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 32 This
permit places limits on the quantities of various pollutants

27. See NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at
58.
28. Jennifer Latson, The Burning River That Sparked a Revolution, TIME
(June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/ [https://perma.cc/X9BTA8TW]; Peter Lehner, House Republicans Wage War on clean Water, NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (July 16, 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/peterlehner/house-republicans-wage-war-clean-water [https://perma.cc/5P28-6823 ].
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
30. EPA Announces Plan to “Revamp” CWA Enforcement Approach,
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, PC, (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.bdlaw.com/news-705.html
[https://perma.cc/28GV-BTWA]; Enforcement Analysts, ARK. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
QUALITY,
https://www.adeq.state.ar.us/water/enforcement/analysts.aspx
[https://perma.cc/N8VP-JHM9].
31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2012).
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the point source may discharge. 33 The limits will be the
more stringent of Technology-Based Effluent Limitations
(TBEL), which generally require that the best technology
for a given category of dischargers be used, or WaterQuality Based Effluent Limitations (WQBEL), which are set
to assure that the state water quality standards are met. 34
The CWA also requires states to inventory
waterbodies based on whether or not the waterbody is
attaining its designated use—known as 303(d) lists. 35 The
waterbodies that do not meet the state’s designated
beneficial uses based on water quality standards and their
associated criteria are deemed impaired. 36 From the
prioritized list of impaired waterbodies, the CWA then
requires states to establish a TMDL. 37 The TMDL, known
colloquially as a “pollution diet,” 38 establishes the
maximum amount of a pollutant the watershed can absorb
before exceeding the associated water quality standards
and designated uses (e.g., fishable, swimmable,
drinkable). 39 The TMDL is established by calculating the
“waste load allocation” for point sources plus the “load
allocation” for nonpoint sources plus a margin of safety. 40
However, only point sources are required to reduce their
discharge to comply with the heightened NPDES permit
restrictions that result from this TMDL analysis. 41

2. Nonpoint Sources

33.
34.
35.
36.

See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 5-6.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (2012).
2 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, UC MERCED AND UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY
PROJECT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
REPORT
4.8-16
(2008),
http://opb.ucmerced.edu/sites/opb.ucmerced.edu/files/documents/vol2_deir_ucmer
ced_small.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XF47-9AMZ].
37. Guercio, supra note 10, at 457-58.
38.
Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl [https://perma.cc/5TGZ-H3ZX].
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(C)-(D) (2012).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(D) (2012).
41. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2012). Hypothetically, the TMDL analysis
could find that nonpoint sources account for ninety-nine percent of the nutrient load
to the waterway, but only the permitted point sources would be required to reduce
their discharge to comply with the water quality standard.
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Regulating point sources put the fire out on the
Cuyahoga River and improved countless other
waterbodies across the nation, 42 but excessive nutrient
pollution from nonpoint sources remains a threat to the
health and economic vitality of many areas of the
country. 43 The nutrients of greatest concern are nitrogen
and phosphorous. 44 The main sources of excess nutrients
in our waterways are agriculture and increasing
urbanization. 45 Excess nutrients from agriculture come
from animal manure and soil erosion associated with
livestock and crop production. The increasing amount of
impervious surfaces—roofs, roads, and parking lots—that
come with expanding urbanization leads to more
stormwater being directed into small streams and
ditches. 46 The increased volume and velocity of water in
these natural channels also leads to further soil erosion. 47
Eroded stream banks release the nutrients that have built
up in that soil over decades. 48 Because the nutrient loads
from nonpoint sources are the result of diffuse stormwater
runoff from, for example, farm fields, and neighborhoods
42. PROGRESS IN W ATER QUALITY, supra note 21, at 13; Latson, supra note
28.
43. EPA, THE FACTS ABOUT NUTRIENT POLLUTION, supra note 3, at 1-2.
44. Id.; Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, supra note 24.
45. EPA, THE FACTS ABOUT NUTRIENT POLLUTION, supra note 3, at 1;
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 58-60. The
Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) has implemented nonpoint
source regulations for farmers in “nutrient surplus areas,” such as Northwestern
Arkansas. Id. at 1-2. Additionally, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs) and stormwater systems for municipalities and construction sites may be
required to obtain NPDES permits under changing state and federal regulations.
Id. at 1.
46. Although the stormwater discharges from many cities and towns are
classified as point sources, thereby required to obtain NPDES permits, the permit
requirements for Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4) are more
similar to nonpoint source regulations in that they typically do not set a nutrient
discharge limit but require cities to educate the community and use BMPs to
achieve pollution reductions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012); see also NPDES
Stormwater Program, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-stormwater-program
[https://perma.cc/M56Y-2NL8].
47. Id.
48. ANDREW SHARPLEY, PENN STATE COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI.: AGRIC. RESEARCH
& COOP. EXTENSION, MANAGING PHOSPHORUS FOR AGRICULTURE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
8
(2001),
http://extension.psu.edu/plants/nutrientmanagement/educational/soil-fertility/managing-phosphorus-for-agriculture-andthe-environment [https://perma.cc/8B47-LASR].
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rather than a discrete pipe, they are considered nonpoint
sources. 49 These nonpoint sources of nutrient pollution
mix with point source discharges and together cause the
economic and environmental harms discussed above.
The CWA leaves the regulation of nonpoint sources to
the states in its cooperative federalism approach, but it
clearly intends for both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution to be controlled “in an expeditious manner so as
to enable the goals of [the CWA] to be met . . . .” 50
Despite the CWA’s federal funding provisions aimed at
reducing nonpoint source pollution, 51 the effort among
states to reduce nonpoint sources of pollution through
voluntary adoption of best management practices (BMP)
has been neither effective nor expeditious. 52
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to address the
growing problem of nonpoint source pollution. 53 Congress
changed the designation of some municipal, industrial,
and construction site stormwater discharges (e.g., certain
street and parking lot drainage systems) from nonpoint
sources to point sources, thereby requiring some of those
sources to obtain NPDES permits. 54
The 1987 CWA Amendments also added Section
319, which requires states to identify nonpoint sources of
pollution and develop management plans for bodies of
water impaired by those sources. 55 However, much like
its predecessor Section 208, Section 319 does not require
state management programs to place any mandatory
regulations on nonpoint sources, making it a largely
ineffective pollution reduction tool. 56
Despite the
availability of federal resources, voluntary programs

49. See What is Nonpoint Source?, supra note 5.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (2012).
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2012).
52. Robin Kundis Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments
Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2015).
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b) (2012). These management programs are required
to identify and implement best management practices to control nonpoint source
pollution. Id.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(1) (2012).
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encouraging BMPs have not achieved the large-scale
nutrient reductions needed from nonpoint sources. 57
To date, the most effective tool in the CWA for
addressing nonpoint source pollution has been the citizen
suit provision. 58 Citizen suits have compelled EPA to
establish TMDLs in twenty-seven cases due to
noncompliance with the CWA. 59 The TMDL establishes
load allocations for point sources and nonpoint sources,
which provides not only a pollutant load cap, but also data
on the quantity of the target pollutant that can be attributed
to nonpoint sources. 60
Using this information, local
watershed protection groups and the regulated point
sources began developing localized water quality trading
programs wherein nonpoint sources could voluntarily
implement BMPs designed to reduce their load of the
targeted pollutant. 61
As states and EPA began complying with the CWA
by establishing TMDLs for impaired waterbodies, point
sources were required to invest in increasingly expensive
technologies with diminishing marginal returns relative to
cost. 62 This in turn put pressure on regulated point
sources at the local level—wastewater treatment plants—
to lobby their state legislators to bring nonpoint sources
into the pollution reduction equation. 63 Some states have
now placed mandatory regulations on nonpoint source

57. David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and
Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 526-28 (1996).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); Guercio, supra note 10, at 472 (discussing the
impact citizen suits had in spurring TMDL implementation by states or EPA).
59. Guercio, supra note 10, at 472.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d)(1)(C)-(D) (2012).
61. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 2.
62. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 6.
63. See, e.g., Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 84-232, 233 (Supp. 2015)). In Arkansas, the Arkansas Water and Wastewater
Managers Association (AWWMA) was instrumental in bringing about Act 335 and
the alternative means of NPDES permit compliance it allows for under the umbrella
of nutrient water quality trading. A Basic History and Vision of Nutrient Trading
and Act 355 2-3 (NWA Intergovernmental Working Grp. & NWA Stakeholders,
Informational
White
Paper,
2015),
http://www.arkwwma.org/pdf/VisionOfNutrientTradingEvolutionOfAct335.pdf
[https://perma.cc/53FB-8RMC].
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nutrient loads, but Arkansas may be able to avoid that by
implementing an effective trading program.

B. EPA Support for Water Quality Trading
In 1996, EPA promoted watershed-based trading as
an innovative way of achieving water quality standards. 64
Two years later, EPA collaborated with the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to protect watersheds
through the “Clean Water Action Plan,” which would
provide federal funds to local stakeholders developing
programs to reduce pollution from point sources and
nonpoint sources. 65 By 2003, EPA published its official
Water Quality Trading Policy, which formalized its support
for using trading to achieve nutrient and sediment
reductions from nonpoint sources. 66 The agency then
published a Water Quality Trading Assessment Handbook
to provide step-by-step guidance for local stakeholders
considering using water quality trading in their
watershed. 67
In 2008, EPA released an evaluation of trading
programs and found that, despite efforts to promote the
programs, there were significant hurdles to their success
and expansion. 68 The evaluation cited ambiguity in the
CWA, over-burdened permit writers, cautious legal
counsel, and local conditions such as the “regulatory,
economic, hydrologic, and geographic circumstances” of
each watershed, as impediments to effective trading
programs. 69 The agency concluded that trading “may be
limited to areas where program coordinators have both a
high level of interest in trading and the talent needed to
64. Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,994-01,
4995 (Feb. 9, 1996).
65. CAROL BROWNER & DAN GLICKMAN, CLEAN W ATER ACTION PLAN:
RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S W ATERS iii-iv (1998).
66. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 1. Despite this
formal policy statement and numerous guidance documents, neither the CWA nor
federal regulations have been amended to formally recognize trading. See id.
67. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at
5-26.
68.
EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING EVALUATION 4-1 (2008),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/epa-water-qualitytrading-evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W8B-YBH2].
69. Id.
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shepherd stakeholders through a challenging program
development and implementation process.” 70
EPA’s
support and guidance has been consistent over the past
decade, yet most states are reluctant to develop the
TMDLs and nutrient criteria necessary to implement
efficient and successful trading programs. 71

C. Judicial Developments Regarding Water Quality
Trading Programs
Even when trading programs receive local support
and EPA approval, they remain subject to judicial
scrutiny. 72 The CWA’s citizen suit provision gives any
citizen with standing the right to sue. 73 EPA has fought
against several of these lawsuits brought by both
environmental and industrial interests claiming injury from
the agency’s action or inaction regarding water quality
trading programs. 74
The litigation has ranged from broad claims that EPA
lacks the authority under the CWA to approve any
pollution-trading scheme, 75 to narrower claims challenging
elements of a trading framework, 76 as well as the typical
questions around whether EPA’s regulatory interpretations
were appropriate. 77 The threshold legal question of
whether trading is allowed under the CWA appears to be
supported by the deference given to regional
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.
2007) (rejecting EPA approval of NPDES permit allowing for pollution offsets in a
303(d) listed stream); cf. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake, 731 N.W.2d 502,
524 (Minn. 2007) (affirming state pollution control agency’s issuance of NPDES
permit that allowed for a new municipal wastewater treatment plant to discharge
phosphorous to a phosphorous impaired stream when that additional pollution
would be offset by reductions from a nearby plant).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012).
74. See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 293 (3d Cir.
2015); Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 73 (D.D.C. 2013).
75. See, e.g., Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 66.
76. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 294; see also Jazil & Childs,
supra note 22.
77. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2015); Friends of Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at
1011-12 (challenging agency interpretations of whether offsets would “cause or
contribute to” a numeric or narrative water quality standard violation); In re Cities of
Annandale & Maple Lake, 731 N.W.2d at 507.

2016]

NUTRIENT WATER QUALITY TRADING

851

administrators under CWA Section 402(a)(2) to issue
NPDES permits that “assure compliance . . . including
conditions on data and information collection, reporting,
and such other requirements as he deems
appropriate . . . .” 78 Allowing point sources to meet their
permit requirements through trading appears to be an
appropriate means of assuring compliance, but should an
injury result from that scheme, plaintiffs may have
standing to sue. 79 Courts have dealt with the narrower
controversies
by
giving
deference
to
agency
interpretations where the statute is ambiguous and the
agency interpretation is reasonable. 80 In spite of this
litigation, states are pursuing water quality trading
programs with varying results. 81
In 2007, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court found
that the state pollution control agency’s interpretation of
federal regulations was reasonable 82 when it decided that
a new source of phosphorous in a phosphorous impaired
waterbody would not “cause or contribute to the violation
of water quality standards” due to an aggregate reduction
from offsets. 83 A few months later, the Ninth Circuit found
in Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA that offsets were
irrelevant because federal regulations unambiguously
prohibited the issuance of permits to new sources of
pollution in an impaired waterbody without first accounting
for how the water quality standard would be met in a
TMDL. 84
78. 33. U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (2012).
79. Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (dismissing complaint for lack
of standing).
80. See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 294-310 (3d
Cir. 2015) (analyzing agency’s interpretation under the two-step test set out in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
81. See Water Quality Trading Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: OFFICE OF
THE
CHIEF
ECONOMIST,
http://www.usda.gov/oce/environmental_markets/water_trading.htm
[https://perma.cc/QVG6-MAWM].
82. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i); see also In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake,
731 N.W.2d 502, 524 (Minn. 2007).
83. Id. at 524-25 (finding that regulation was ambiguous and agency
interpretation was reasonable; however, dissenting justices finding federal
regulation unambiguously prohibited approval of the permit).
84. 504 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that EPA’s NPDES
permit approval violated the plain language of the federal regulation). Decades
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In Friends of Pinto Creek, the EPA and Carlota
Copper argued that the agency’s NPDES permit approval
was appropriate because the new discharge would be
offset due to increased pollution reductions from a
separate upstream point source and, therefore, would
create no “detectable change in water quality.” 85 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument finding that although
section 122.4(i)(2) does not prohibit NPDES permit
approval to new sources discharging into impaired
streams, it does require “(1) . . . sufficient remaining
pollutant load allocations to allow for the discharge; and
(2) [that] existing dischargers into that segment are subject
to compliance schedules designed to bring the segment
into compliance with applicable water quality standards.”86
The court held that the purpose of section 122.4(i)(2) was
not merely “to show a lessening of pollution, but to show
how the water quality standards will be met if [the new
source] is allowed to discharge pollutants into the impaired
waters.” 87 The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded EPA’s
permit. 88
The Supreme Court denied requests for
certiorari, despite the Ninth Circuit’s conflict with
Minnesota’s Supreme Court. 89 If Arkansas relies on the
Ninth Circuit’s precedent when developing its water quality
trading program, then any new sources discharging
nutrient pollution to a nutrient impaired waterway will have
to be accounted for in a TMDL. The availability of trading,
however, could alleviate some of the burden imposed by
the pollution restrictions required of point sources under a
TMDL.
prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Friends of Pinto Creek, the Supreme Court
reversed a similar finding from the Tenth Circuit in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. 91 (1992). Id. at 1013-14. In Arkansas, the Court found that the Tenth Circuit
inappropriately interjected its interpretation of the CWA that no permits could be
issued to new sources that would contribute to a water quality violation, but only
because neither party raised the issue and deference to EPA’s approval was
appropriate where there would be no “detectable change in water quality.” Id. at
1013.
85. Friends of Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)).
86. Id. at 1013.
87. Id. at 1014.
88. Id. at 1017.
89. Id.
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As courts require states and EPA to comply with the
CWA by ordering the implementation of TMDLs, the
interest in trading schemes grows. 90 In thirty-eight of the
states where environmentalists sought compliance with
the Act’s TMDL requirement, twenty-two states were
ordered to work with EPA to establish TMDLs for
thousands of impaired waterbodies. 91 In recent years,
important TMDL litigation has centered on what EPA can
require in establishing or approving a state’s TMDL for an
impaired waterbody. 92
In the 2013 case Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 93
environmental advocates argued that EPA’s approval of a
TMDL, which allowed for water quality trading as a means
for attaining established water quality standards, would
lead to pollution “hotspots” in the watershed and diminish
their members’ use and enjoyment of the watershed. 94
The D.C. District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim on
procedural grounds because they lacked standing due to
the fact that EPA’s approval of a TMDL that allowed for
trading pollution credits was not a final agency action, as
required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 95
The court reasoned that EPA approved trading as a tool
that could be used to meet permit requirements—but was
not an agency requirement. 96 Furthermore, the court
found that the plaintiffs suffered no “actual or imminent”
harm as a result of the approved trading programs. 97
Agency action will be final and the injury will be actual or
imminent only if the agency approves trades or offsets that
can be proven to create hotspots or some other harm. 98

90. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 2015).
91. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CLEAN WATER ACT
AND TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMDLS) OF POLLUTANTS 2-3 (2008),
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/97-831.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9G2H-3JBW].
92. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 287; see also Food & Water
Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 66 (D.D.C. 2013).
93. Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 62.
94. Id. at 73-74.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 81-85.
96. Food & Water Watch, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
97. Id. at 74-75.
98. Id. at 73-74, 81-82.
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In 2015, the Third Circuit applied Chevron deference
to EPA’s interpretation of the CWA’s TMDL requirement. 99
In American Farm Bureau Federation, the court found that
the words “total maximum daily load” were ambiguous; 100
thus, Chevron deference was appropriate and the
agency’s interpretation was deemed reasonable in light of
Congressional intent. 101 EPA interpreted the CWA “to
require publication of a comprehensive framework for
pollution reduction in a given body of water.” 102 The
American Farm Bureau Federation argued that in
establishing a TMDL, EPA could do nothing more than
calculate a numeric value identifying the maximum
pollution loads in a waterbody and then leave the state to
decide what actions—if any—would be taken to meet the
TMDL. 103 The Third Circuit found that EPA’s interpretation
of its role in establishing TMDLs did not infringe on states’
rights when requiring them to outline how the TMDL would
be met and what the state would do if the TMDL were not
met. 104
These judicial developments, along with EPA
guidance, establish guideposts for developing Arkansas’s
nutrient water quality trading program. Admittedly, these
guideposts leave much to be desired in terms of clarity
and finality. However, they remain important markers in
the historical development of water quality trading worthy
of analysis when creating Arkansas’s new regulatory
framework.

III. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR NUTRIENT
WATER QUALITY TRADING
99. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 294-309 (3d Cir. 2015).
See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (articulating the appropriate standard to use when reviewing an agency’s
construction of a statute it administers).
100. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 297-98.
101. See id. at 301-06.
102. Id. at 288.
103. Id. at 297-99.
104. Id. at 301-06.
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In order for water quality trading programs to succeed
in Arkansas, the way in which these programs are viewed
by environmental advocates, regulatory agencies, and
regulated parties must change. Trading cannot continue
to be characterized as pay-to-pollute by the environmental
community. 105 Whether the regulated point source pays
for advanced technology to meet the water quality
standard, pays for BMPs at a nonpoint source, or
contracts for point source trades to achieve the same—or
greater—reduction, the reduction will have a cost. It is
simply a question of how much the point source must pay
and whether the water quality standard can be achieved
through nonpoint source trades. Point sources have
achieved great reductions in nutrient discharges under the
CWA regulations over the past forty years, but the
objectives of the CWA cannot be met by controlling point
sources alone. 106 For instance, in many municipalities it is
no longer economically efficient to require ever-greater
phosphorous or nitrogen reductions from point sources
(primarily wastewater treatment plants) while exempting
nonpoint sources (primarily agricultural land and urban
centers). 107
Nutrient water quality trading will provide an
opportunity for nonpoint sources to voluntarily reduce their
contribution to the nutrient pollution problem. In return,
point sources may purchase credits that will be generated
by the nonpoint source’s reduction. When the cost for
105. See Zach Corrigan, The Case Against Water Quality Trading, 30 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 16-17 (2015).
106. Id. at 15-17.
107. Presentation, Billy Ammons & Heath Ward, City of Fayetteville, Nutrient
Trading and Act 335: A Short History and Progress Report (undated) (on file with
author) (showing cost of reducing phosphorous from a nonpoint source to be
approximately $300,000 versus the cost of equal reductions from point source
technology upgrades to be approximately $18,000,000); Letter from Lioneld
Jordan, City of Fayetteville, Ark. Mayor, to Dr. Al Armendariz, EPA Region 6
Admin’r
4
(Oct.
12,
2011),
https://www3.epa.gov/region6/water/npdes/illinoisriverwatershed/documents/corres
pondence/cty-of-fayetteville-commit-to-waterquality-oct12-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PA9N-Y43F] (stating that planned point source reductions would
cost $90-100 million in capital upgrades with questionable environmental benefit);
The Role of Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water Objectives, supra
note 11, at 10-11 (citing the cost of point source reductions as at least two to three
times greater than reductions from nonpoint sources).
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nonpoint sources to generate credits is lower than the cost
of investing in advanced technology at the point source,
the point source will purchase the nonpoint source’s
credits thereby creating a Nutrient Water Quality Trading
market. 108 Technological advancements such as using
Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) to apply nutrients to
agricultural land more efficiently, 109 or using proven BMPs
to reduce the amount of nutrients leaching into
waterbodies 110 coupled with advanced modeling and
monitoring, are making it easier to verify the nutrient
reductions from nonpoint sources. 111 The certainty of
these quantifications will likely never be as accurate as the
measurements from the end of a point source pipe, but
there are methods of accounting for this uncertainty, which
make nutrient trading a cost-effective strategy for meeting
water quality standards. 112
Similarly, regulated point sources must change the
way they view the CWA’s TMDL requirement. Historically,
a TMDL meant that the state or EPA would analyze and
allocate phosphorous loads for both point and nonpoint
sources, then require only point sources to reduce their
load in order to meet the water quality standard. 113 It still
does. 114 However, with a trading program in place, point
108. See The Role of Water Quality Trading in Achieving Clean Water
Objectives, supra note 11, at 3, 5, 11.
109. STATE OF ARK., ARKANSAS WATER PLAN: NUTRIENT REDUCTION
STRATEGY
13-14,
http://arkansaswaterplan.org/references/ar_nutrient_reduction_strategy101014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LHG-DA7Y].
110. See IOWA STATE UNIV. SCI. TEAM, IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY
4-5
(2013),
http://www.nutrientstrategy.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/documents/NRS2141001.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3FJ-ZNLV].
111. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 130.
However, advancements in modeling and monitoring still do not provide 100%
accuracy; watersheds are dynamic systems, which means uncertainty is inherent.
See UNIV. OF ARK. DIV. OF AGRIC.: PUB. POLICY CTR., THE ROLE OF NONPOINT
SOURCE
MODELS
IN
WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT
1,
3-4,
https://www.uaex.edu/publications/pdf/FSPPC112.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8N5PJBWR].
112. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 30-33.
113. Program Overview: Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL), EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/program-overview-total-maximum-daily-loads-tmdl
[https://perma.cc/6FLZ-J2RL].
114. See id.
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sources will be able to achieve that reduction by
purchasing less costly credits generated by nonpoint
sources or other point sources. The TMDL analysis is an
essential starting point for understanding load allocations
among all sources, which provides a foundation for this
market-based solution. 115 Although EPA has approved
trading schemes in watersheds without a TMDL, those
trades must be approved on a case-by-case basis,
supported by TMDL-like analysis, and then included in the
point source’s NPDES permit. 116 Any trading flexibility lost
due to the establishment of a TMDL is counterbalanced by
greater load allocation certainty. Greater certainty will
make potential market participants more comfortable
entering the market and regulatory agencies more likely to
approve trading schemes, which in turn creates greater
market efficiency. None of this is possible without an
updated regulatory framework, which allows trading
programs to function as a viable tool.
The difficulty for all parties lies in the details of
structuring a program so that adequate checks are in
place on the economic incentives to trading such that
water quality standards are met. Ultimately, the CWA
requires point sources to make reductions that will meet
water quality standards. 117 Even in an approved trading
program, if the standard is not met due to economically
efficient though ineffective trades, the point source
remains potentially liable for meeting the water quality
standard. 118
Despite the challenges involved, Arkansas has the
benefit of drawing on previous EPA decisions, court
115. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 33 (supporting
assertion that TMDLs were essential to EPA’s 2003 Water Quality Trading Policy
and generally make trading more feasible).
116. WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 6; see, e.g., City of
Fayetteville,
Ark.
Res.
No.
59-06
(Mar.
21,
2006),
http://www2.adeq.state.ar.us/downloads/WebDatabases/PermitsOnline/NPDES/Sp
ecialReports/AR0020010_Resolution%20No.%2059-06_20060321.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7B5L-LSVS]. Although this Agreement was not technically a
trade and was not created using TMDL-like analysis, it does exemplify ADEQ’s
willingness to approve permits where nonpoint source reductions account for some
portion of the point source’s requisite reductions. Id.
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
118. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 5- 6.
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precedents, and the successes or failures of other
watersheds over the past thirty years to guide
development of its regulatory framework. By addressing
the legally contentious aspects of nutrient trading, the
administrative rulemaking process can result in a
regulatory framework that satisfies the CWA’s mandates
while encouraging cost-effective trades. 119 This will be a
very detail-specific process, but it will provide trading
efficiency, verifiable reductions, and require buy-in from all
interested parties, which will minimize litigation-risk.
Important aspects of this framework should include: (1) the
importance of numeric criteria for nutrients in those
watersheds engaging in trading; (2) limitations on trades in
watersheds without TMDLs for nutrients; (3) an express
prohibition on trades that result in water quality
impairments; and (4) clear requirements for how point and
nonpoint sources may generate tradable credits.
Act 335 brought about a collaborative approach to
developing a nutrient trading program in Arkansas, starting
with the appointment of an advisory panel. 120
The
advisory panel, appointed by Governor Asa Hutchinson, is
made up of nine members representing specified
interests, including NPDES permitees with valuable insight
into how this regulatory framework may affect their
operations. 121 The advisory panel will offer essential
stakeholder input, but the agency employees who are paid
by the state for their experience and expertise in
administering the state’s water quality regulations should
take an active role in developing this framework as well.
Working together, the stakeholders should address: (1)
the criteria used for limiting nutrient pollution; (2) the need
for TMDLs in watersheds seeking to trade; (3) how to
119. See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (2016) (establishing the use of offsets
and tradable credits from pollution reduction activities in the Chesapeake Bay
Watershed); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-450 (2015).
120. See Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1515-17 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 8-4-233 (Supp. 2015)); Press Release, Governor Asa Hutchinson Announces
Appointments
(July
1,
2015),
http://governor.arkansas.gov/pressreleases/detail/governor-asa-hutchinson-announces-appointments-150701
[https://perma.cc/TFH7-Y6DC].
121. Act 335, 2015 Ark. Act 1512, 1515 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4233(a) (Supp. 2015)).
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avoid hotspots and impairments caused by trading; and
(4) the specific requirements for sources seeking to
generate tradable credits.

A. The Necessity of Numeric Criteria for Nutrients
Deciding whether to use narrative or numeric criteria
is a fundamental step in developing the regulations
needed to encourage local trading programs. The criteria
to be used for individual pollutants are generally set by the
state, and can be either narrative or numeric. 122 Most
states continue to use narrative criteria to determine
whether a waterbody is nutrient impaired. 123 However,
allocations based on narrative criteria are inherently more
subjective than those based on numeric criteria. 124
Moving toward numeric criteria for nutrients satisfies the
CWA’s Section 304 requirement that EPA develop water
quality criteria based on the latest scientific knowledge. 125
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012).
123. See State Progress Toward Developing Numeric Nutrient Water Quality
Criteria for Nitrogen and Phosphorus, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/wqsits/nncdevelopment/ [https://perma.cc/JHJ4-E59A].
124. See, e.g., Regulation Establishing Water Quality Standards for Surface
Waters of the State of Arkansas, Ark. Pollution Control and Ecology Comm’n Reg.
No.
2
§
2.509,
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/rulesRegs/Arkansas%20Register/2011/Oct11Reg/0.1
4.00.10-005.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X53-Z2C4]. A typical narrative nutrient criteria
looks like this: “Materials stimulating algal growth shall not be present in
concentrations sufficient to cause objectionable algal densities or other nuisance
aquatic vegetation or otherwise impair any designated use of the waterbody.” Id.
Whereas the numeric criteria for Chlorophyll-a in Beaver Lake is more finite:
Beaver Lake*:
Chlorophyll-a (ug/L)** = 8; Secchi Transparency (m)*** = 1.1.
*These standards are for measurement at the Hickory Creek site over
the old thalweg, below the confluence of War Eagle Creek and the
White River in Beaver Lake.
**Growing season geometric mean (May - October).
***Annual Average.
See E-mail from Angela N. Danovi, Projects Manager, Ozarks Water Watch
Found., to Doug Szenher (May 8, 2013, 4:01 CST) (on file with author). Although
numeric criteria are commonly used to measure pollutants such as metals in
Arkansas, the quasi-numeric Chlorophyll-a criteria implemented for Beaver Lake is
the first numeric criterion in the state to address nutrient pollution. See id.
125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2012).
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EPA has consistently pushed states to adopt numeric
criteria for nutrients126 and the absence of numeric criteria
could result in state or federal regulators rejecting a
proposed trading program because of the additional
complexity involved in interpreting narrative criteria. 127
Advances in technology make reliable numeric criteria for
nutrients possible. 128 Narrative criteria are used by trading
programs in some jurisdictions, but permit writers must
take extra precautions to comply with federal regulations
requiring “reasonable potential” analysis of whether
nutrient loads may exceed the state’s narrative criteria. 129
Although some jurisdictions have developed trading
programs around narrative criteria, 130 it is clear that
numeric criteria provide greater certainty when developing
TMDLs and trading programs. This makes program
approval more likely and creates a clear market demand—
based on a numeric value—that can be satisfied by credits
incorporated into a point source’s NPDES permit.

B. Limit Trading to Watersheds with TMDLs for
Nutrients
126. See Memorandum from Nancy K. Stoner, supra note 24, at 2-3 (citing
history of EPA encouraging states to implement numeric criteria for nutrients and
their importance for developing effective trading programs); see also Sarah T.
Babcock, Nutrient Trading as Clean Water Strategy in the Interstate Context, AM.
BAR
ASS’N:
SECTION
OF
ENVTL.
LITIG.
(July
23,
2015),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/environmental/articles/summer20
15-0615-nutrient-trading-clean-water-strategy-interstate-context.html
[https://perma.cc/RYM9-MGJC].
127. See ARK. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, INTEGRATED WATER QUALITY
MONITORING
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
III-25
(2014),
http://www2.adeq.state.ar.us/water/branch_planning/303d/pdfs/integrated_wqmar_
20140401.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5JF-3QAB]; see also EPA REGION III, LOCAL
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION WHEN USING CREDITS FOR NPDES PERMIT ISSUANCE
AND COMPLIANCE 8-9 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201507/documents/localwaterqualitytm20140306pg.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VTW-AU5R].
128. See Technical Support for Numeric Nutrient Criteria Development, EPA,
http://www2.epa.gov/nutrient-policy-data/technical-support-numeric-nutrientcriteria-development [https://perma.cc/U87A-AMKS].
129. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(i) (2015).
130. Rena Steinzor et al., Accountability: Water Quality Trading in the
Chesapeake Bay 12 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, Briefing Paper No. 1205, May
2012),
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/WQT_1205.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XMW5-WBJT] (finding that two of the seven Chesapeake Bay
states have some numeric nutrient criteria though the majority continue to use
narrative criteria).
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With set numeric criteria for nutrients, the state can
more easily prioritize a list of nutrient-impaired waters as
required by the CWA. 131 TMDLs should be developed in
those watersheds eager to trade. Data from the TMDL
can then be used to set the NPDES permit limits, which
will be used as the pollution caps that drive trading. 132
Most existing trading programs use pollution caps
established under a TMDL to drive demand for credits. 133
Although EPA supports pre-TMDL trading, if the
watershed fails to attain the water quality standard through
offsets or trading, then a TMDL will be established. This
will result in a new trading baseline. 134 In the case of
nonpoint sources seeking to generate tradable credits
from their BMPs, the nonpoint source must first comply
with all regulatory management requirements, thereby
meeting the baseline. 135 However, if a TMDL must be
established, then the load allocations among nonpoint
sources and point sources will be set, and “the reductions
made to generate credits for pre-TMDL trading may no
longer be adequate to generate credits under the
TMDL.” 136 This new baseline may be problematic for the
present market participants. 137 Trading under a TMDL
provides the greatest certainty for market participants, but
pre-TMDL trading could be used to “bridge[] the time from

131. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C) (2012).
132. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 4-6; see also
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2015) (recognizing the
“pollution caps” established by CWA’s TMDL and permit requirements).
133. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 8.
134. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 5 (finding
trading baseline is the regulatory requirement that must be met before any
additional nutrient discharge reductions will be available as tradable credits).
135. See EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING SCENARIO: NONPOINT SOURCE
CREDIT EXCHANGE 33, https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit_npscredit-exchange.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED5S-4PKU].
136. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 5.
137. See id. (providing that a TDML will be set if pre-TDML does not achieve
required water quality standards, but the reductions made for the pre-TMDL may
not be adequate under the newly developed TMDL); Alexandra Dapolito Dunn,
Water Quality Trading: Bringing Market Forces to Bear in Watersheds, 17 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 137, 138 (2002).
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when a water is listed as nutrient impaired to the time the
TMDL is complete.”138
The details of Arkansas’s nutrient water quality
trading program could be included in the TMDL or NPDES
permit on a case-by-case basis in conjunction with a
Watershed Implementation Plan (WIP). 139 For instance,
the Chesapeake Bay TMDL acknowledges state plans to
comply with the TMDL cap and allow for population and
industry growth by using offsets from non-point sources. 140
EPA has supported water quality trading programs in the
Chesapeake Bay “as long as they are established and
implemented in a manner consistent with the CWA, its
implementing regulations, and EPA’s 2003 Water Quality
Trading Policy 141 and 2007 Water Quality Trading Toolkit
for NPDES Permit Writers.” 142
Acknowledging the
approved trading guidelines in a TMDL is more efficient
than relying on the permit writer to analyze the validity of
trades on an individual basis. The Chesapeake Bay
TMDL goes on to expressly prohibit trading that would
“cause or contribute to an exceedance of [Water Quality
Standards] in either receiving segments or anywhere else
in the Bay watershed,” or “that would delay or weaken
implementation of the Bay TMDL, that is inconsistent with
the assumptions and requirements of the TMDL, or that
would cause the combined point source and nonpoint
source loadings covered by a trade to exceed the
applicable loading cap established by the TMDL.” 143

C. Prohibit Trading that Results in Impairment

138. MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, PRE-TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
PHOSPHOROUS
TRADING
PERMITTING
STRATEGY
1
(2008),
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=10762
[https://perma.cc/LEU3-64FN]; WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at
7.
139. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 7.
140.
See
EPA,
CHESAPEAKE
BAY
TMDL
10-1
(2010),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201412/documents/cbay_final_tmdl_section_10_final_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6ZG29R9].
141. Id. at 10-3.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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The most common argument against trading is that it
will result in “hotspots.” 144 In the water quality context, a
“hotspot” is a waterbody segment with “locally high
loadings of pollutants.” 145 High levels of nutrient pollution
can cause increased algal blooms, which impact the
aesthetic value of the lake or stream, can cause fish kills,
or even result in toxic drinking water. 146 EPA’s Trading
Policy expressly prohibits trades that are likely to result in
hotspots. 147 The concern stems from the fact that trading
may allow point sources to continue discharging pollutants
at their current level or increase their discharge, which
might create hotspots of nutrient pollution because the
pollution reduction was made somewhere else in the
watershed. 148 Allowing point sources to trade nutrient
reductions with any nonpoint source in the watershed
could result in the nonpoint source BMPs mostly being
located downstream from the point sources. The higher
water quality below the BMPs would then dilute the waste
load from the point sources enough to comply with the
TMDL. 149 However, the segments between the point
sources and the nonpoint source BMPs could create
hotspots that impair the water’s designated use (e.g.,
drinking, fishing, and swimming). 150
144. See Sean Blacklocke & Ben Dziegielewski, The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s Water Quality Trading Policy: New Opportunities for
Environmental Advocacy Groups?, 3 AWRA HYDROLOGY & WATERSHED MGMT.
TECHNICAL
COMMITTEE
1,
8,
9
(2005),
http://www.awra.org/committees/techcom/watershed/pdfs/0301WU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QTZ6-V683].
145. See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24,
at 6.
146. See Jeff Stone, Health Advisories Issued for Cyanotoxins, 28 ARK.
DRINKING
W ATER
UPDATE
3,
3
(2015),
http://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/programsServices/environmentalHealth/Engineeri
ng/drinkingWater/Documents/Publications/Newsletters/Summer2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2QJ-EQFL]; see also Nutrient Pollution: Harmful Algal Blooms,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/harmful-algal-blooms
[https://perma.cc/CE2S-C84D].
147. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 4, 7.
148. See WATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24,
at 17.
149. See id. at 17.
150. See id. at 15-16 (stating that a hotspot is a waterbody segment with
“locally high loadings of pollutants and illustrating that longer segments between
sources accumulate more pollutants); see also Stone, supra note 143 (explaining
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Because permit compliance is measured only at the
point source, nutrient reductions from trading should occur
upstream from the permitted point source in order to avoid
hotspots. 151 EPA acknowledged the potential hotspot
issue in its Water Quality Trading Policy, stating that “EPA
does not support any use of credits or trading activity that
would cause an impairment of existing or designated uses,
adversely affect water quality at an intake for drinking
water supply or that would exceed a cap established
under a TMDL.” 152 More recently, Region 3 of the EPA
addressed this concern by concluding “the generator of
the credit should be upstream of the buyer or user of the
credit, as a way to minimize the risk of water quality
impairment in the water between the two sources.” 153
If data shows that point sources are creating hotspots
caused by their downstream trading activity, it may result
in costly litigation. 154 Trading programs should avoid this
litigation risk by limiting point sources to trading with
upstream sources. This limitation may significantly reduce
the number of potential market participants 155 but will
ensure compliance with the law.

D. Requirements for Sources Seeking to Generate
Credits
1. The Role of Baselines
The baseline is the regulatory minimum that potential
market participants—point source or nonpoint source—
must meet before being eligible to generate credits. 156
that high concentrations of cyanotoxins would make water toxic and unsafe to
drink).
151. See id. at 15-16.
152. See WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 7.
153. EPA REGION III, LOCAL WATER QUALITY PROTECTION W HEN USING
CREDITS FOR NPDES PERMIT ISSUANCE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 124, at 7.
154. Corrigan, supra note 104, at 18 (finding “hotspots” to be among several
potential weaknesses in state trading programs which may be ripe for litigation);
see, e.g., Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 73 (D.D.C. 2013).
155. See, e.g., GEOSYNTEC CONSULTANTS, NUTRIENT TRADING IN MISSOURI:
CRITICAL POLICY FACTORS AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS 8, 33-35 (2013),
http://www.mocorn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CIG_Nutrient-Trading-inMissouri_Feb2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/X24A-JWHC].
156. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 4-5.
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Only nutrient reductions in excess of the established
baseline will be available for trading. 157 Every unit of
phosphorous the point source eliminates beyond its
Technology Based Effluent Limitation or Water Quality
Based Effluent Limitation will generate a water quality
credit. Similarly, every unit of phosphorous or nitrogen
removed from a nonpoint source beyond the state’s
regulatory requirements will be eligible for a water quality
credit. Because nonpoint sources are not subject to
NPDES permits and state regulatory requirements on
nonpoint sources are limited, the potential supply of
credits from nonpoint sources is greater than that available
from most point sources. 158
Arguably, the opportunities created by trading are
inconsistent with the CWA goal that “best” technology
requirements will incentivize advances in technology to the
point of zero discharges. 159 The problem with this goal is
that it only incentivizes advances in pollution reduction
technologies for point sources, which are not the primary
sources of nutrient pollution. While trading could create a
disincentive to “best” technology advancements for
existing point sources, it will, on the other hand, create
incentives for technological advances for nonpoint
sources. 160 Then again, the opportunity for point-to-point
trading may also increase the incentive among point
sources to invest in advanced treatment technology.

2. Point Source Generated Credits
Point source credits may be generated through overcontrol. 161 Typically, new facilities entering the watershed
are able to incorporate the most advanced technology,
which allows them to discharge nutrients below their
permit limit. 162 Any facility that maintains their nutrient
157. See id. at 5.
158. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 1; See WATER
QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 9-10 (Figure 2.2).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2012).
160. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 1.
161. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24,
at 22.
162. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 15.

866

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:839

discharge below their permit limit may trade the surplus
with facilities that exceed their permit limit. 163 The point
source to point source trade is the most “straightforward,
easily measurable, and directly enforceable” option
available under a trading program. 164 The point source
seller will enter into a contractual trade agreement with
another point source buyer in the same watershed. 165
This agreement will then be incorporated into each
facility’s NPDES permit. 166 The point source to point
source trade can also be transmitted through a point
source credit exchange where multiple point sources in a
watershed can buy or sell credits as needed. 167 These
exchanges hold credits no longer than the reconciliation
period corresponding with the effluent type. 168 When
available, point source to point source trading can be an
economically efficient option with little uncertainty. 169
However, credits from point source over-control are rarely
available and far more expensive than nonpoint source
credits due to the high cost of technologies capable of
removing ever-smaller amounts of phosphorous or
nitrogen.

3. Nonpoint Source Generated Credits
Alternatively, nonpoint source to point source trades
can be a cost-effective means of achieving the same or
greater nutrient reductions required to meet the point
source’s permit limit. 170 The difficulty in trading with
nonpoint sources is that they are not as straightforward or
easily quantified. This is where the state’s regulatory
framework should provide clear requirements for nonpoint
sources generating credits, which would not otherwise
163. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24,
at 22.
164. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 15.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 16-17.
168. Id. at 34-37. Reconciliation periods can be thought of as the shelf life or
expiration date of any given nutrient reduction credit. Id. The length of the
reconciliation period will depend on the type of pollutant being traded. Id.
169. See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 15.
170. See id. at 17-18.
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occur. By establishing a framework that addresses the
concerns around monitoring, the uncertainty of pollutant
reductions, and the timing of BMP-generated nonpoint
source credits, the regulations can ensure both legal
compliance and consistency among trading programs
across the state.

4. Quantification and Monitoring
The choice of monitoring method is an important
scientific and policy determination that needs to be
addressed in statewide guidance or regulation. As with
each of these important decisions, consideration must be
given to more than economic efficiency and political
expediency in order to gain EPA approval and avoid costly
litigation. Monitoring is a federal requirement for point
source permit compliance and must also be addressed
when generating water quality credits from nonpoint
sources that benefit the regulated point source. 171
Fortunately, Arkansas has a relatively advanced network
of water quality monitoring stations currently in place 172
and the University of Arkansas employs some of the top
scientists in the field. 173
Establishing an equivalency between the quantity of
nutrients reduced by point source dischargers and edgeof-field reductions from nonpoint sources is not exact.
Nonpoint source reductions can be quantified using three
techniques: (1) modeling; (2) pre-determined BMP
efficiencies; or (3) direct monitoring. 174 Pre-determined
BMP efficiencies based on best available scientific data
are a practical starting point for nonpoint source trading,
171. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL PHASE I:
NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND PROTECTION PLAN 120
(2010),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/finalphaseiwip.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H649-TSLB].
172. See ARK. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, INTEGRATED WATER QUALITY
MONITORING ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 124, at III-1.
173. See, e.g., UNIV. OF ARK. DIV. OF AGRIC.: PUB. POLICY CTR., THE ROLE OF
NONPOINT SOURCE MODELS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT, supra note 110, at 4.
174. See, e.g., W ILLAMETTE P’SHIP, IN IT TOGETHER: A HOW -TO REFERENCE
FOR BUILDING POINT-NONPOINT W ATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAMS: DESIGNING
AND OPERATING A TRADING PROGRAM (PART 2 OF 3) 20-21 (2012),
http://willamettepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/In-It-Together-Part2_2012-07-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9EN-YP52].
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but greater accuracy comes from site-specific monitoring,
which can be developed over time. 175 Modeling can be an
effective method of tracking nutrient load reductions from
nonpoint sources, and with the advancements in
technology modeling is becoming the preferred method of
monitoring. 176 Direct monitoring, while the most accurate
method, is also the most costly, and thus less often used
in trading programs. 177

5. Uncertainty Ratios
After using the best scientific data available to
quantify the nutrient reduction from a given BMP, any
remaining uncertainty can be accounted for using an
uncertainty ratio. These ratios are commonly used in
established trading programs and are encouraged as a
means for ensuring effective pollutant reductions by both
EPA and USDA. 178 Unfortunately, as with limiting the
generation of credits to upstream sources, uncertainty
ratios will further increase the cost of credits generated
from nonpoint sources. 179 However, using a conservative
2:1 or 3:1 uncertainty ratio can still be a cost effective
option. In fact, trading could remain cost effective with a
10:1 ratio in some instances. 180 Fortunately, decades of
research provide adequate certainty that BMPs generating
water quality credits can be accurately valued using a
smaller than 10:1 uncertainty ratio. 181 As methods of
quantifying BMP nutrient load reductions continue to
175. Id. at 21.
176. Id. at 20.
177. Id. at 21.
178. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 24,
at 16.
179. See, e.g., GEOSYNTEC CONSULTANTS, NUTRIENT TRADING IN MISSOURI:
CRITICAL POLICY FACTORS AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 152, at
7-8, 33-35.
180. See supra note 106.
181. See, e.g., IOWA STATE UNIV. SCI. TEAM, IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION
STRATEGY, supra note 109, at 5 (“[T]he [phosphorus] management strategies of
cover crops (50% reduction) and conversion of all tillage to no-till (39% reduction)
have the potential to substantially reduce [phosphorus] loss. Converting all acres
of intensive tillage (<20% residue) to conservation tillage (>30% residue) would
potentially reduce [phosphorus] loss by 11%. Injecting or banding of [phosphorus]
within current no-till acres has little potential impact on [phosphorus] loss (<1%).”).
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improve, the value and supply of potential nonpoint source
credits will increase. Nonpoint to point trading programs
will further incentivize these improvements by creating a
market for more accurate data.

6. Timing
The timing of trades is another foundational issue that
should be addressed in the state’s framework. Concerns
around timing focus on the point at which credits
generated by nonpoint sources may be used by the point
source to meet their permit requirements. 182 For instance,
anticipated credits generated by a nonpoint source partner
will not be available until the BMP has been implemented
and verified. Once verified, the credits generated may
only be used during the same compliance period. So, if
the point source compliance period for phosphorous is one
month, then a point source can purchase credits from
nonpoint sources that are generated during that month.
Permitting guidance provides for longer averaging periods,
such as an annual rather than monthly average, to
address seasonality concerns associated with nonpoint
source trading. 183 This allowance can be made if the
permit writer determines that “monthly average, weekly
average, or maximum daily limitations” are “impracticable”
when calculating nutrient reduction averaging periods. 184
If, however, Arkansas’s trading framework favors
economic efficiency over compliance with the CWA’s
mandates, EPA could expand its oversight of the
Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality’s (ADEQ)
issuance of NPDES permits as it did after Act 964 was
passed in 2013. 185

D. Water Quality Management Plan and Watershed
Implementation Plans

182.
183.
184.
185.
Benefield,
author).

See WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT, supra note 19, at 35.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Letter from William K. Honker, Water Quality Prot. Div. Director, to Ryan
Ark. Dept. of Envtl. Quality Deputy Dir. (Aug. 28, 2013) (on file with
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Arkansas’s regulatory framework will provide broad
program guidance, but the CWA requires states to
implement water quality management plans at the local
level. 186 These management plans may provide a useful
platform for integrating water quality trading programs at
the local level.
Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs) have been
developed
by
local
and
regional
watershed
187
organizations
along with state governments across the
nation as a framework for implementing programs to attain
water quality standards. 188 They are an outgrowth of the
CWA’s requirement that states develop ongoing water
quality management plans. 189 In its Final Water Quality
Trading Policy, EPA acknowledged the importance of
using WIPs developed from the state’s Water Quality
Management Plan when developing a trading program. 190
WIPs should build off the state’s statutory or regulatory
framework. The most advanced implementation plans
have been developed and approved by EPA in the states
under the Chesapeake Bay TMDL. 191 Not all state WIPs
are as stringent as those developed by the Bay states, but
each should contain nine key elements: (1) identify
causes and sources of pollution, (2) determine load
reductions needed, (3) develop management measures,
(4) identify technical and financial assistance needed, (5)
develop information/education component, (6) develop
implementation schedule, (7) develop interim milestones
186. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(3) (2006).
187. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs),
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl/chesapeake-bay-watershedimplementation-plans-wips [https://perma.cc/4EWB-XLG9].
188. See, e.g., Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), MO. DEP’T OF
ENVTL.
QUALITY,
https://www.deq.state.ms.us/mdeq.nsf/page/WMB_WIPs?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/AS87-CQVB]; Implementing Maryland’s Action Plan: Building
Local Partnerships to Meet Bay Restoration Goals, MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T,
http://www.mde.state.md.us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementation/Pages/
WIP_Implementation.aspx [https://perma.cc/43M2-HB4C].
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (2012).
190. See W ATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 11, at 6; see also 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (discussing water quality standards and implementation
plans); 40 C.F.R. § 130.6 (2015) (discussing Water Quality Management Plans).
191. See Chesapeake Bay Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), supra
note 184.
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to track implementation, (8) develop criteria to measure
progress toward meeting watershed goals, and (9)
develop monitoring component. 192 WIPs must ultimately
receive approval from the Regional EPA office. 193

E. Memorandum of Understanding
The successful implementation of these plans first
requires buy-in from multiple state agencies, which can be
achieved through a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU). 194 The MOU defines the roles and responsibilities
of each agency based on the mutual goal of attaining
water quality standards in the watershed. 195 Depending
on the watershed boundaries, the MOU may require
interstate agency collaboration. 196 Once the state has
established the roles and responsibilities of the various
agencies, the focus can turn to establishing baselines,
what can be traded, credit values for particular BMPs,
credit terms, and other important details specific to the
particular watershed implementation plan.

IV. CONCLUSION
Arkansas has taken an important first step toward
reducing nutrient pollution from nonpoint sources across
the state by passing Act 335 to allow trading. The
framework that is being developed now will determine
whether trading provides economic and environmental
benefits to local communities or leads to costly litigation

192. See EPA, A QUICK GUIDE TO DEVELOPING W ATERSHED PLANS TO
RESTORE
AND
PROTECT
OUR
WATERS
3
(2013),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201512/documents/watershed_mgmnt_quick_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EV8-YXTV];
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 1, at 11-19;
Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs), supra note 185.
193. Polluted Runoff: Nonpoint Source Pollution: 319 Grant: Current
Guidance,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/polluted-runoff-nonpoint-sourcepollution/319-grant-current-guidance [https://perma.cc/VU5S-KMBY].
194. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL PHASE II:
WATERSHED
IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN
31-32
(2013),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/finalphaseiiwip.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH4PV6MJ].
195. See id.
196. See id.
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while the damages of nonpoint source pollution continue
to grow.
Nutrient water quality trading can work. Once the
framework is in place, small-scale, pilot programs would
be a good first step. The patience, diligence, and
creativity of all participants will be essential to the longterm success of this new approach to pollution reduction.
The environmental impacts and economic costs
associated with reducing nutrient loads from point sources
alone is well documented. Our current regulatory scheme
has failed to prevent some lakes and streams from
becoming unfit for fishing or swimming, and it is becoming
increasingly costly to treat for drinking water. Once the
regulatory framework is in place, Arkansas’s nutrient water
quality trading program could provide a market-based
solution that moves The Natural State toward cleaner
lakes and streams while making progress towards the
primary objective of the CWA: eliminating water pollution
from all sources.
NATHAN R. FINCH

